I present a Stackelberg model of conflict, in which contestants have limited endowments to be put in two separate sectors, thus incorporating salient features of many conflicts. The model is applied to the case of conflict over natural resources. Consistent with amounting empirical evidence regarding a so-called "resource curse," I find that the relation between conflict intensity and resource rents is non-monotonous, and that the economy's income growth rate may be negatively affected by resource abundance.
Introduction
Conflict is part of life. Be it collegial competition over work promotions, a fight between members of a family or village, or violent conflicts on a large scale, such as civil wars and disputes between states, conflict adversely affects the economic, physical and emotional well-being of many people. It is therefore unsurprising that research into the ultimate and proximate causes of such events has become a lively field in economics. Following significant theoretical advances in the early 1990s on the "economics of conflict" in general (e.g. Hirshleifer [1991a] , Hirshleifer [1991b] , Hirshleifer [1995] , Grossman [1994] , Grossman and Kim [1995] ), the field has developed and now encompasses thorough econometric work and more focused theoretical analyses.
The structure of conflict games is always similar in essence. Two agents have the choice between productive or contesting (unproductive) activity. Their objective is to maximize their utility. Utility is derived from two sources: (1) A share of total production, aided by the productive inputs of both agents, goes to each of the agents.
(2) The allocation of the contested prize 1 depends on the relative contesting efforts supplied by each agent. An increase in the prize makes contesting activity more attractive to both contenders. That is, productive activity aids both agents, whereas the payoff of (unproductive) contest activity only accrues to the agent undertaking it.
So far the literature has neglected some salient features of contests. Most conflict models consider a situation of conflict in a Cournot setting (simultaneous choice) (see for example Garfinkel [1990] , Skaperdas [1992] , Grossman and Kim [1995] ) over an endogenous prize (usually production output) (see for example Garfinkel [1990] , Hirshleifer [1991b] , Grossman [1991] , Skaperdas [1992] , Grossman [1994] ). In this paper I consider a situation in which (1) the two contenders are not of equal standing, but one has a first mover advantage (i.e. a Stackelberg game), and (2) competitors fight over an exogenous prize (i.e. not created by the participants in the contest). 2 Endowments are limited and can be allocated either to productive (benevolent) or contesting (malevolent) activity. Due to limited resources, an agent that decides to be productive, has less endowment to engage in contesting activity and vice versa. I am not aware of work that captures a combination of a Stackelberg game with conflict over an exogenous prize. Yet, there are many real-life situations to which a model with these features is applicable.
In particular the model readily applies to situations of conflict between, for example, the ruler and the people of a country. 3 They compete for control over a flow of rents, that stems from development aid or natural resource rents. But conflict is not inevitable -rebelion may be deterred by the threat of force, or the people may be pacified by public investments. Following important work by Azam [1995] , Azam [2001] and also Azam and Mesnard [2003] , I assume that the ruler may invest in defense to quell opposition, or that he may "buy the peace" by providing a productivity-enhancing public good (also see Grossman [1994] , and, for empirical evidence, Azam et al. [1996] ). On the other hand the people spend their effort either on productive working or on stealing rents. Many resource rich countries witness the latter type of behaviour. For instance in Nigeria rebels continuously try to divert pumped-up oil and trade it. Such a situation is best modeled using a Stackelberg approach with the ruler as a first mover (as was also recognized by for example Azam [1995] , Azam [2001] , Grossman [1991] , Grossman [1994] ). First, a government's actions are readily observable for all parties involved. The government has the intent and arguably the essential function of guiding people via its policies. This quality suggests that the government is well described as a leader in a Stackelberg game.
Another reason why, within the Stackelberg setup, it is natural to consider the ruler as the leader is that the contesting efforts of the ruler and the people respectively are of an inherently different kind. The committed party is the one assumed to be the leader in a Stackelberg game. A ruler's contesting takes a much more organized and institutional form than the one of the people. To fulfil his defensive goals, the ruler needs to create an army (institutionalized infrastructure), which implies concertive administrative efforts. The bureaucracy involved bars him from changing his behaviour very quickly. As a result, a ruler is slow to respond, whereas rebels are rather "quick on their feet". The people can, sloppily said, simply "grab a gun" and fight as rebels. They tend to be more flexible in their contesting decisions. Thus a ruler is more committed to its actions than the people, which makes him the natural leader in a Stackelberg game.
The contribution of the paper is three-fold. First, I present a general conflict 3 Also one could think of other real life situations where such a model framework is applicable. For one, think of a situation in which co-workers compete for a certain position in an organization. The utility of each agent is given by the status of the position he is holding and his income. The contested prize is the status and prestige connected with the position. The Stackelberg leader is the incumbent, i.e. the person holding the position at the present moment. He has a first-mover advantage, for example due to better access to information. The follower is the person that longs for the position. Both have the choice to allocate their total available effort (which is their working time, i.e. 8 hours a day) to either contributing to the organization's output (and thus increasing their salary, whereby the organization's output is allocated among the agents in the form of salaries) or engage in unproductive "mobbing" of the other person in order to acquire the position. model that incorporates salient features of many conflict situations. That is, I model a Stackelberg game in which both contenders have limited endowments to put into contesting an exogenous prize or productive activities. In this paper I focus on the example given above, in particular I consider a situation of conflict among a ruler and the people over natural resource rents. The second contribution of the paper is thus to examine the relationship between the amount of resource rents and conflict activities. I find that it is characterised by a hump-shape relation. Conflict intensity is low at very low and very high levels of resource wealth. It peaks at intermediate levels. Third, I trace out the effect of resources on economic performance. I find that resource wealth may induce a "convergence from above". That is, resource rich countries may overshoot at times, converging back to their "normal" income level as resource rents dry up.
The model outcomes are consistent with empirical evidence. Recent work by Collier and Hoeffler [2004] suggests that opportunities for rebelion (sometimes referred to as the "greed motive") are an important driver of conflict. This corroborates analyses implicating natural resources as a cause of civil war (e.g. Collier and Bannon [2003] , Ross [2004a] , Ross [2004b] ). A robust empirical finding is a nonmonotonous relationship between the amount of resources and the extent of conflict activity in an economy (Collier and Hoeffler [1998] ). Conflict intensity does not, as one might expect at first sight, increase linearly with the amount of resource rents, but peaks at intermediate values. I reproduce this finding in my model, and thereby provide a theoretical underpinning of the empirical result.
In addition, empirical work also associates natural resources with low or even negative economic growth rates (see for example Sachs and Warner [1997] ). The link between resources and conflict possibly represents another manifestation of what has become known as the "curse of natural resources". 4 There is empirical evidence that the resource curse is due to some "convergence from above" of countries. Overshooting at some point, resource rich countries converge back to adequate income levels as time passes (Rodriguez and Sachs [1999] ). I find a similar result in my theoretical model, whereas the causal mechanism is different from the one in Sachs and Rodriguez. 5 4 The term "resource curse" refers to the empirical fact that resource poor countries have, on average, worse growth experiences than their resource rich counterparts. Recently it has been found that the curse extends to other dimensions as well, that is resource rich countries fare worse in terms of institutional quality (Isham et al. [2005] ) and many developmental indicators, such as life expectancy (Bulte et al. [2005] ). For evidence on the resource curse see for example Sachs and Warner [1997] , Sachs and Warner [2001] , Isham et al. [2005] and Michaels [2006] . 5 Sachs and Rodriguez argue that if resource money is invested domestically rather than abroad, this leads to investment and consumption booms at home, which in turn increase domestic output. Thus, resource rich countries live beyond their means for a while, before falling back to "normal" income levels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the general conflict model using the interpretation of conflict over resource rents. I explicitly examine the role of resource rents in a Stackelberg model of conflict, recognizing the inherent difference of the ruler and the people respectively. This is an important point of difference between this work and other recent theoretical contributions on conflicts and natural resources. Hodler [2006] develops a model in which institutional quality is endogenously determined. Natural resources decrease productive activity via two channels; they increase the incentive to fight, and decrease the incentive to work because conflict erodes institutions (i.e. weakens property rights). Wick and Bulte [2006] trace out the effects of the resource's pointiness on appropriative actions in the economy. Both of these works consider contenders to be of equal standing, which may be inappropriate in the context of conflict between unequals, such as a ruler and the people. In Section 3, I propose a concrete specification and am thereby able to trace out the optimal appropriative effort decisions of both agents as a function of resource rents in Section 4. In the following sections, I turn to applications of this result. Section 5 considers the relationship between conflict intensity and resource wealth. This is done by considering the comparative static properties of the results of Section 4 with respect to the amount of resource rents. In Section 6, I argue that resource rents may well vary over time, thus the results of Section 4 lend themselves to a dynamic interpretation (as in Caselli and Coleman [2006] ). While assuming that resource earnings fall over time, I trace out the effect on income levels and growth. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The general model
The two agents in the model are the ruler and a rebel leader who represents the people or the population of a country. Resource rents are fueled into the economy, and thus provide the incentive to engage in contesting activity. Think for example of a situation where the government receives resource rents as a sort of usage fee paid by an (international) firm extracting the resource. Then there are different approaches to capture the notion that the people may wrestle those rents from the government. First, following Tornell and Lane [1999] , one may view the public budget as a common pool from which various groups try to secure a share. Second, one can develop a model where rebels fight to control part of the resource stock, so that they themselves become the residual claimant of some of the resource rents generated by the international firm. Third, and closest to the specification that I have in mind, one can think of a model where rebels steal part of the output generated by the firm, and sell it elsewhere. The example of Nigeria, where there is widespread diversion of pumped-up oil that is subsequently traded, serves me as a practical motivation to my choice. The degree to which such theft is possible is, of course, determined by enforcement and hence is subject to choices made by the government. It does not matter whether the rebels take the physical output (oil, diamonds, or another commodity) or money -one can easily be converted into the other.
There are two separate sectors in the economy, a manufacturing and a resource sector. Both groups in society have a certain "budget" they can allocate to two possible activities, production and contesting the resource rent. The rebel leader allocates the people's effort to stealing and production, so they potentially turn into a rebel force if contesting the rent is profitable. The ruler has a budget which he can use to provide a productivity-enhancing public good or he can allocate to the contest. Moreover, the ruler taxes the people's production (or otherwise benefits from it). Following Azam, I assume the ruler and people play a Stackelberg game, with the government as the Stackelberg leader. But my specification of the contest process is different from Azam: the ruler can, as a first mover, at some cost choose how much of the rent he wants to fully secure. The rest is open for contesting, and may be grabbed by the people. This means the government controls the size of the contested prize.
The setup
Production in the manufacturing sector is given by a general production function F(φ ,W ) with
∂W 2 ≤ 0, where φ denotes a productivity enhancing public good and W is the working effort provided by the people. That is, I assume non-increasing positive marginal returns to productive activities. Production benefits both the people and the ruler who either taxes production (in case of a formal sector) or benefits from bribes and kickbacks (in case of an informal sector). To hone in on the key tradeoff between production and fighting I treat the tax (or bribe) rate τ as constant and exogenous.
The proceedings of the resource sector are also split between the two parties. The split is determined by the respective contesting efforts. I call G(D, E) the "grabbing function", where D is the governmental defense effort and E is the people's stealing effort. The amount of rent grabbed by the people is given by R · G (D, E) , where R denotes the flow of resource rent poured into the economy. 6 Accordingly 6 Just like most literature on the topic (see for example Collier and Hoeffler [1998] ), I use a flow variable to measure resource wealth of a country. This is in line with the extensive literature on the resource curse, where it has been found that it is usually resource flows (most commonly used in the literature is the share of primary goods exports in total exports) and not resource stocks that inhibit a country's development (Ding and Field [2004] , Stijns [2001] ). the government receives share (1 − G(D,E)) of the rent R. That is, I assume that grabbing is -independent of the size of R -determined by the relative contesting effort levels. I assume positive, decreasing marginal returns to contesting activities, that is
e. the marginal return of people's stealing decreases in the governmental defense effort. Finally, I assume ∂ 2 F ∂W∂φ > 0, which means that the marginal return to people's working effort increases in the public good provided.
The rebel leader allocates effort across the two possible activities, so that for the people the following budget constraint is relevant: W +E ≤ N, where N is total effort available. Similarly, the ruler has a budget Q that he divides between the contest and public good provision: D +φ ≤ Q.
Contesting efforts as strategic substitutes or complements?
Since the people are the follower in the Stackelberg game, I consider, by backwards induction, first their maximization problem. It is given by:
Note that I normalize the people's endowment, N, to 1. Budget constraint (2) will always be fulfilled with equality (since π P is strictly increasing in both arguments, E and W), so that "wasting" any effort is never optimal. 7 The optimal stealing effort of the people, E * , is defined by
The LHS denotes the marginal benefit of an increase in E, the RHS the marginal cost. If rebels devote more effort to stealing, they can secure more of the resource (MB). On the other hand, it implies less time for working, so that income from production decreases (MC). How does rebel stealing effort, E, respond to an increase in defense, D? To examine whether contest activities are strategic substitutes or complements, I investigate how the MB and the MC change with an increase in D.
7 Note that this implies that
Increasing defense effort D has two counteracting effects on optimal stealing effort. First, there is a direct negative effect because there is less to steal for the people (the unsecured rent, i.e. the potential prize for the rebels, becomes smaller). But there is an indirect effect as well. If the government increases defense effort, less resources are left to be invested in the public good. This implies that the productivity of effort in production falls, so that the opportunity cost of stealing decreases. This effect works to increase the optimal stealing effort of the people. Hence, both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of E decrease, as D goes up. Which of the two decreases more determines the sign of
If the marginal benefit decreases more than the marginal cost (the case that will be discussed later) then ∂ E ∂ D < 0, and (E, D) are strategic substitutes. For other functional forms it could be the case that
Note that if either the production function or the grabbing function were additive in their inputs, this would have straightforward effects on the results. In particular:
• If the production function is additive in its inputs, then
Note that this implies that there is no possibility for the ruler to lure the people into production, i.e. "buying the peace" is not possible. In this case (E, D) are strategic substitutes.
• If the grabbing function is additive in its inputs, then
Here the strategy of "sheer force" does not work. People are not "scared away" by high governmental defense effort. Thus (E, D) are strategic complements.
The respective contesting efforts (E, D) might be complements or substitutes, depending on the functional forms chosen. That is, high governmental defense effort can either drive people away from stealing natural resources and push them into the manufacturing sector, or it can lead to the opposite, since high government expenditure on defense means very little investment in productivity enhancing public goods (because the government has limitations on how much it can spend). This in turn lowers the opportunity cost for stealing of the people, i.e. they tend to steal more. To go one step further, I next turn to a concrete specification of the model. The robustness of the results with respect to other functional specifications is discussed as I go along.
An example of a specified model
In this section I discuss the results of the model given specific functional forms. In particular I assume manufacturing output to be given by F(φ ,W) = (1 +φ )(1 + W). 9 The grabbing function (denoting the share of the resource grabbed by the people, as a function of the respective contesting efforts) is assumed to be G(D,E) = (1−D γ )E α . One can interpret R·(1−D γ ) as the undefended rent or potential prize for the rebels. Given their stealing effort E, rebels win the amount R(1 − D γ )E α of the resource. The amount of rent grabbed is increasing in the contest effort of the population and decreasing in the contest effort of the ruler. I assume α = 1 2 and γ = 1. 10,11
The people's problem
The people are the follower in the Stackelberg game. Given policy choices by the government (D,φ ) and using the specification introduced above, I can solve for their reaction function by maximizing their utility as given by (1)-(4). Optimizing, I find:
The government's problem
The government, assumed to be dictatorial, is a selfish ruler that, like the people, is only interested in its own income. The government receives income via resource rents and taxation of production. It can implement policies that raise productivity in manufacturing or allocate effort to defense to secure part of the rent flow. The former policy raises the tax base, which is a direct effect. In addition, it increases the opportunity cost of stealing effort for the rebels. This is an indirect benefit, 9 I assume a production function linear in its inputs for mathematical ease. The results typically carry over to nonlinear specifications. To see this consult Appendix 2.
10 Numerical simulations show that the presented results do not change qualitatively for other values of α and γ (both ≤ 1 of course). That is, the assumption of α = 1 2 and γ = 1 is only for mathematical ease, and does not drive the results.
11 As a referee correctly pointed out setting α = γ would be more intuitive since then the grabbing function would be equally sensitive on the margin to the effort of the ruler and the people. Unfortunately such a specification in general does not allow for an analytical solution. The only tractable such case is given by α = γ = 1. Then optimality for the people dictates a corner solution, which makes this case not all that interesting. For an interior solution diminishing marginal returns to contesting for the people are needed.
because it raises the share of uncontested resource rents falling back into the hands of the ruler, as demonstrated below.
The government maximizes its utility (i.e. income) with respect to defense (D) and public good provision (φ ):
where
and
Note that (10) is always fulfilled with equality, as wasting any effort is never optimal for the government (the objective function is increasing in both φ and D). With respect to (11), I assume Q ≥ 1. Thus, in principle it is possible for the government to defend all of the resource. Otherwise, if I allowed for Q < 1, the ruler could not, even if he devoted all his resources to defense, secure all the resource. I do not want to impose this exogenously. Nevertheless, this arises as an endogenous result as I go on.
Consistent with the specification for the rebels, I assume a multiplicative function for securing resource rents: R · D. Depending on the choice of D, a fraction of the rent is potentially available for the rebels:
, leaving the remainder for the ruler (because it is too expensive to steal). Note that for an interior solution D * < 1 must hold. Below I show that this condition is always satisfied. That is, it is never optimal for the government to defend all of the resource.
Strategic interaction
Since the government is the Stackelberg leader it faces the people's response as an additional constraint. Upon substituting (10) in (6), the people's reaction function with respect to governmental defense D is obtained:
It is readily verified that the government's and rebel force's contest effort levels are strategic substitutes. 12 Raising D both lowers the prize available for the people (discouraging stealing) and the opportunity costs of stealing 13 , but the former unambiguously dominates the latter. Formally note that
The conflict literature finds that conflict levels may be both strategic substitutes or complements, i.e. the sign of ∂E * ∂ D is generally ambiguous (see for example Addison et al. [2002] or Azam [1995] ). In section 2, I showed that both cases are possible in the presented model setup, (E,D) may be strategic substitutes as well as strategic complements. With the chosen specification, I can unambiguously sign the impact of the ruler's on the people's choice. Here, the government is able to "scare away" the people.
Results
In this section I characterize optimal choices of the Stackelberg leader and follower as a function of the amount of rents R in the economy.
Optimal defense effort of the government -characterizing

D *
I first trace out the behavior of D * . Note that since the effort constraint (10) of the government is always fulfilled with equality an optimum is fully characterized by D * , as φ * = Q − D * . The first order condition of the ruler is given by 14
An increase in defense effort has three effects on the profits of the government. First, it changes the rebels' optimal stealing effort (and hence production effort)(A).
12 This unambiguity is, as discussed before, a result of the functional forms assumed. 13 An increase in D comes at the cost of a decrease in φ , because the ruler has a limited endowment. Once he puts more of his effort in defense, less is left for the public good. As a result productivity in the manufacturing sector is lower, and thus the opportunity cost of stealing decreases.
14 To arrive at this result I employ the envelope theorem -Appendix 2 shows the derivations.
Second, it leaves the economy with a lower level of the public good, decreasing manufacturing output (B). Third, it secures more of the resource for the government directly (C). 15, 16 Plugging in the concrete specification yields
Note that
For a clean representation of the results, I trace out the qualitative behaviour of D * via an indirect way. In Appendix 1 it is shown that the objective function of the government is always concave in D. Therefore there are only two qualitatively different forms of the objective function that may emerge.
Evaluated at D = 0 it could be the case that
< 0 with the objective function monotonically decreasing in D. Obviously this translates into an optimal D of 0; D * = 0 always. Alternatively, it could be that
> 0 (with the slope decreasing thereafter). This translates into an optimal D greater than 0, D * > 0. Formally, the slope of π G in the point D = 0 is given by:
The second term on the RHS of (18) is increasing in R. So for sufficiently large values of R, I find that
> 0 and D * > 0. But as R decreases, defense effort is no longer worthwhile for the ruler. Denote R as the threshold value for the rent flow that warrants defensive effort (i.e. for R ≤ R, D * = 0). This threshold value is given by:
Summarizing, for R > R, D * > 0, and for R ≤ R it is the case that D * = 0. This suggests that D * decreases as R goes down. Indeed, by differentiating the FOC (implicitly defining the optimal D) with respect to R, I find:
15 Intuitively, one might argue that I have "forgotten" one effect. Since the optimal stealing effort of the people changes as a response to an increase in defense, this also has an effect on the resource income of the ruler. This effect can be neglected though (as a result of the envelope theorem) 16 Note that when τ = 0 (the case of a purely informal economy, as for example considered in Marcouiller and Young [1995] ) there is no negative effect of an increase in D (given (E, D) are strategic substitutes as is the case in my specified model). In this case the ruler does not provide any public good φ * = 0.
Equation (20) implies that optimal defense effort of the government declines as R falls. Above various costs and benefits associated with raising D have been identified, and (20) illustrates that the net marginal benefits of increasing defense effort are falling as the flow of rents dries up. This makes intuitive sense. Moreover this result is robust to the choice of functional forms. That is, given the assumptions of section 2, optimal D always increases in R. 17 In Appendix 1 two further results about the optimal allocation of effort by the government are derived: (i) the function relating resource rents to conflict effort is concave, and (ii) the ruler will never defend all the resource (i.e. D * < 1). This latter result implies also that it is never optimal for the government to allocate its entire endowment to conflict (D * < Q). 18
Optimal stealing effort of the rebels -characterizing E *
Having characterized the path of optimal behaviour of the ruler I now proceed by solving for the people's response. Remember that:
17 To see this intuitively, note what happens to the marginal benefits and marginal costs of governmental defense D, when R increases. First note that the marginal cost of D (as given by B in equation (16)) decreases in R. If R is high, people devote more effort to stealing, i.e. work less. Thus the public good is less effective, which translates into a decrease in the marginal cost of D. Second, let us look at the marginal benefits. They are made up of two components. An increase in governmental defense effort affects the ruler's payoff positively through two different channels: (1) An increase in defense secures the ruler more of the resource (C in equation (16)). Governmental defense is more effective if R is high. (2) An increase in defense induces people to work more. This effect of broadening the tax base is more pronounced if R is high. That is, the marginal benefit of D increases with R and the marginal cost decreases, so that ∂D * ∂ R > 0 always. Consult Appendix 2 for a more formal treatment of this discussion. 18 One could think that Q should, instead of being exogenous, depend on the amount of resource rent secured by the government plus its manufacturing income (i.e. the total income of the government). As was pointed out by a referee, this value can only be determined in equilibrium. As the analysis turns out to be extremely difficult and cumbersome, a fully fledged investigation of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper and has to be left for future research. Other people have recognized this difficulty too, and to circumvent this problem have worked with an exogenous effort constraint in similar models (see for example Hirshleifer [1991b] or Skaperdas [1992] ). In effect this assumption may not be all that unrealistic if, for instance, one thinks of the effort constraint in terms of time.
The effect of increasing the inflow of rents on the allocation of effort is a priori unclear because of the intervening response by the government. One can write
The sign of
The term in brackets is made up of a "bounty effect" and a "public good effect". The first part reflects that increasing R raises the stakes in conflict -there is more to fight over (effect A). However, an increase in R also triggers an increase in D (for R > R), which in turn lowers the bounty accessible for the people (effect B).
The bounty effect appears a priori ambiguous, but in Appendix 1 it is shown that it is always negative (i.e. works to decrease E). In addition, the increase in D leads to a reduction in the public good, so that the public good effect in the expression above is always positive: it works to increase E (effect C). The next question, then, is whether the bounty or public good effect dominates, and governs the path of E. For the presented model, one can show that ∂ E * ∂ R < 0 holds, or that the bounty effect dominates (see Appendix 1). 19 Here a decrease in R induces a sufficiently large decrease in D to imply a rise in R(1−D) (i.e. in the bounty). This effect is strong enough to offset the counteracting public good effect, and thus people increase their stealing effort as R decreases.
Note that two of the described effects (effects B and C) drop out when
Therefore a complete description of the path of E * is as follows:
19 For a more general discussion on the path of E * consult Appendix 2. There I show that both
In Appendix 1 I show that E * (R) is convex in the range where R > R and concave where R ≤ R.
Since the people only have one unit of effort available, I cannot a priori rule out corner solutions. Formally, a more complete description of E is as follows:
So that I find
. The function T(R) provides the threshold level of defense. Note that
Corner solutions for E * can be ruled out by assuming D * (R max ) > T(R max ), where R max is the highest level of R considered. 20 Corner solutions are evidently less insightful, thus we assume the above throughout the paper. 21 20 For R < 2(1−τ), I know that T(R) > (1+Q). Furthermore I know that 2(1−τ) < R, as defineď by equation (19), and that for R < R, D * = 0. That is, condition (29) is always fulfilled. If R > 2(1−τ) then T(R) < 0 for R < R = 2(1−τ)(1+Q). Also I know that R <ˇR. And finally it is true that ∂T(R) ∂ R > 0. All of this together means that the assumption D * (R max ) > T(R max ) is sufficient to rule out corners. 21 What would happen if the above condition were not satisfied, and thus a corner solution would eventuate? E * could hit a corner for high values of R, if at some point D * (R) < T(R). Then the ruler realizes in this range of R values the people do not react to his defense, but just choose E * = 1. In this case his optimization problem is max D τ(1 + Q) + D(R −τ). This makes perfect sense when one acknowledges the fact that now the ruler only has to take into account the direct effects of his increase in defense (so he can disregard any effects his choice has on the working/stealing effort of the people). An increase in D will on the one hand secure the ruler more of the resource, but on the other hand decrease the public good, lowering his income from the manufacturing sector. If R > τ 
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Figure 1: Conflict effort of the ruler (D, solid line) and the people (E, dashed line) as a function of the flow of rents (R)
Note that this figure is drawn for decreasing R. At the farthest point to the left R = R max , and at the farthest point to the right R = 0. 23 At this point one might wonder how results would change if the taxation rate τ, taken as an exogenous parameter in the model, were to increase. 24 I find that the overall effect on conflict intensity is ambiguous. Increasing the tax rate implies the government gets to keep more of the benefits from manufacturing, providing an incentive to invest more in the productivity-enhancing public good. But there is also an indirect effect, triggered by the changed incentives that the people now face. For high values of τ, the people fight more and work less (decreasing the incentive of the government to invest in φ ). Changing τ therefore not only affects 22 A sufficient, though not necessary, condition for the two curves to cross is given by R max > R, where R is derived in Appendix 1. 23 With respect to section 6 this means that one can picture time t on the x-axis (see Section 6). 24 I would like to thank an anonymous referee whose comment encouraged me to look into this important question. the distribution of income, but it also affects the creation of wealth. A detailed formal discussion can be found in Appendix 1. One could also think of a situation where τ is not exogenous, but endogenous. It can be endogenized in two ways. First, τ could be another choice variable in the government's problem. 25 In this case the model is not solvable analytically anymore. Numerical solutions show that the qualitative behaviour of the paths of E * and D * remain unchanged though (see Appendix 3).
Second, the people and the government could contest over the amount of taxes that has to be paid. 26 In this case the government (the people) exerts some effort in order to collect (refuse to pay) taxes. Thus there is conflict over the distribution of production output. In such a model an exogenous (resource rents) and an endogenous (production income) prize is contested. Whereas many other conflict models consider the situation of contest over an endogenous prize (see for example Grossman [1991] , Hirshleifer [1991b] ), the present paper focuses explicitly on a situation of contest over an exogenous prize. Since in endogenous prize models the agents' conflict decisions determine the contested prize, different incentives 27 are at work. In the current paper, I thus abstract from this issue to focus clearly on a different mechanism.
Next I apply the above results 28 about the paths of conflict efforts to two particularly interesting questions concerning the role of natural resources. I first look at the relationship between resource rents and conflict intensity. Second, I consider the effect of a change in resource rents, and the implied change in contesting efforts, on income of the economy.
A hump-shape of conflict intensity
In this section, I look at a cross-section of countries all endowed with a different degree of resource wealth, and investigate the differing conflict experiences the model suggests. I then relate the theoretical results to empirical evidence by Collier and Hoeffler [1998] .
Conflict intensity
From Figure 1 , note that when resource rents are large (Section I in the graph), the ruler and the people fight over control of the rents. The ruler has a first-mover advantage, and secures a large share of the rent (crowding out the rebels). If the flow of rents is smaller, incentives for the ruler are different. He provides less conflict effort, and more productivity-enhancing public goods instead. Since D is lower, the rebels respond with a higher contest effort. If rental payments are below the threshold value R (Section II), the rents are too small to warrant government defense. The ruler provides no defense at all, and the optimal allocation of effort by the rebels is exclusively governed by the amount of rents fueled in the economy. At R = R, the comparative statics result of rebel conflict effort with respect to the size of the resource flow switches sign, and rebels' stealing effort is now decreasing when R becomes smaller. When there is no resource, i.e. R = 0 (Section III), both groups concentrate their effort on manufacturing, that is the government sets φ = Q and the rebels provide W = N.
This gives all the ingredients necessary to characterize conflict intensity as a function of rents R. Just like there are different ways to measure the intensity of conflict in reality, there are also different ways to capture conflict intensity in stylized models. One convenient and straightforward definition of conflict intensity, C, is as follows:
This representation captures the fact that it takes two to wage a war. Even if one party puts in a lot of effort, and the other does not, then no conflict arises. It postulates that relatively "even" conflicts are more intense than uneven ones (holding aggregate conflict effort constant), and captures that intensity increases if both parties allocate more effort to conflict. These are all desirable features. From Figure 1 it is evident that the relation between conflict intensity and resource abundance is non-monotonous for the specified model. 29 In particular, the relation between intensity and abundance is characterized by an inverted U shaped relationship. To verify this, move from "left" to "right" in Section I in Figure 1 , keeping track of min(D * , E * ). At high R, D * > E * , but after the curves cross the reverse holds. The finding of an inverted U shaped relation between resources and conflict intensity is consistent with empirical work by Collier and Hoeffler [1998] and Collier and Hoeffler [2004] .
In particular, Collier and Hoeffler find in their papers a non-monotonous relationship between resources (measured as primary good exports) and civil war occurrence. They define civil wars as events that cost more than 1000 deaths per year. Note the good fit between their definition of civil war and my measure of conflict intensity. At high levels of R, my measure of intensity is low as D is small and the threshold (of civil war occurrence) may not be reached. No civil war occurs. At intermediate levels of R, my measure of intensity is higher. If it crosses the threshold, my model predicts the occurrence of a civil war. Finally, at low levels of R, the measure for intensity falls below the threshold, so my model again predicts no civil war. That is, the presented model predicts a civil war only at intermediate values, and none at very low or very high levels of resource wealth. Therefore there is a strong match between the implications of the model presented and the empirical findings of Collier and Hoeffler.
They propose the following underlying mechanism: Resource wealth has two counteracting effects on the probability of civil war so that the overall effect is ambiguous, and the hump-shape evolves. That is, for low values of R one effect overweighs, whereas for high levels the other effect is stronger. The two effects are the following. First, more resources allow the government to increase their military expenditure. Thus the government can suppress potential opposition and the probability of a civil war decreases. Second, more resources increase the potential prize for rebel groups if they manage to capture the state, thereby increasing the risk of conflict. My general equilibrium set-up, with a given span of control, allows for a different explanation. That is, accounting for alternative occupations and investment opportunities for the ruler also yields the inverted U.
A way to empirically tell apart the two theories is to look at the allocation of resource rents between the ruler and the people. 30 Collier and Hoeffler propose that the second effect explained above overweighs for low values of R, whereas the first effect overweighs for high values (thus the hump-shape of conflict intensity evolves). This in turn means that for very low R, Collier and Hoeffler's theory proposes that people are not very aggressive, conflict intensity is low. As R increases people get more aggressive and conflict intensity rises, since the second effect overweighs in this range of R values. Thus, for low R the government grabs most of the resource. In the presented model on the other hand, at low R the ruler provides very little defensive effort, whereas the people put forth much stealing effort. That is, the presented model predicts that people receive a large share of the resource rent, if R is relatively low.
An alternative conflict measure -the economic costs of conflict
To gain further insight on the results I next employ an alternative measure of conflict. An economic measure of conflict intensity measures how much production is foregone due to conflict activity. Define
where the superscript E stands for economic, N for no conflict, and C for conflict. GDP is given by the income from the resource, R, plus income from the manufacturing sector F(·). By assumption, in a "no-conflict economy" the population puts all its effort into working. In a "conflict economy" on the other hand, income from production depends on the contesting decisions of the agents. I refer to C E as the economic costs of conflict in what follows. Using the specific functional forms, the economic costs of conflict are given by the following expression:
Note that if R ≤ R (since then D * = 0), the economic costs of conflict are given by
In general, the evolution of this measure of conflict intensity is given by
which is, using the functional specifications,
If R > R the effect of an increase in R is ambiguous. If R is high, the government puts forth more defense effort, i.e. provides less of the public good, decreasing manufacturing output. This increases the economic costs of conflict (effect A in equation (37)). On the other hand, people steal less when R is high, providing more working effort and thereby increasing manufacturing output. This decreases the economic costs of conflict (effect B in equation (37)). Increases in R may thus increase or decrease the economic costs of conflict. Note that for R ≤ R, I find that
That is, for R ≤ R, the economic costs of conflict are decreasing, as R goes down. Thus, whenever ∂C E ∂ R | R max < 0, I find a hump-shape also of this -economicconflict measure.
Convergence from above -resource rents and income
In this section I employ the results of section 4 to investigate how income of an economy varies with resource rents. To put the results in the context of the literature on the natural resource curse, I follow Caselli and Coleman [2006] in arguing that resource rents fall over time. This assumption has many justifications. In particular this time path is the result of an intertemporally optimizing firm, that has some market power, extracting a finite and non-replenishable resource stock. 31 Thus I can readily interpret the comparative static results of section 4 and 5 in a dynamic context, following the fate of a single economy over time, as its resource rents fall.
Income in the economy is defined as the sum of rental payments and the value of manufacturing. In light of the recent controversy about the relation between income (growth) and resource abundance -the so-called "resource curse" -it is instructive to consider the trajectory of income over the three sections, detailed in section 5. Section III, where the resource is depleted, is trivial in this respect: aggregate income is simply given by GDP III = 2(1+Q) and it is constant over time ( ∂GDP ∂t = 0). But dealing with the other sections is more challenging.
For example, in section II GDP is given by
This is a quadratic function in R that reaches its maximum at some level of R, that I denote as R * . A change in R has two counteracting effects in section II, which together yield this form of GDP II . When rental payments go down, there is a direct and negative effect on aggregate income. However, lower rents induce a decrease in E, so working effort of the people goes up which works to raise GDP. For 31 See for instance Conrad and Clark [1987] .
higher R values, the working effort effect dominates and GDP goes up when R falls. In contrast, for lower levels of R, the direct resource effect dominates and GDP decreases when R falls. How does the presence of a flow of resource rents affect an economy's income? The effect is typically ambiguous. Denote income in a non-resource economy as GDP N . For sufficiently low values of R, R < R, resource flows provide an impetus for income: GDP II > GDP N . But I also find that income growth rates are adversely affected by rental payments. A complete characterization depends on the value of the tax rate τ. Three possible cases can emerge. (1) For "low (1 − τ)" I find R * < R < R. This implies GDP II will initially be below GDP N , but as extraction proceeds income will increase and eventually GDP II > GDP N (when R < R). Income further increases, but then starts to fall. In final stages the resource economy will experience a negative growth rate, until R = 0 is reached. The resource economy's income approaches the non-resource economy's income from above. (2) For "intermediate levels" of (1 − τ) I find that R * < R < R, and GDP II > GDP N throughout. Depending on R, the resource economy experiences positive or negative growth and eventually, as above, GDP II approaches GDP N from above. (3) For "high levels" of (1 − τ) I find R < R * < R, so that GDP II > GDP N , as above. But, unlike the case above, it is always the case that income in the resource economy is decreasing over time. For a formal treatment and a graphical representation of the above results, consult Appendix 1.
Taken together, these possibilities suggest that the behavior of GDP II for a range of R values is the same (notably, this holds when R is not too great -which is the situation that will eventually emerge in all societies after extraction has proceeded sufficiently long). Rental payments will (i) increase income levels, but (ii) result in negative growth rates. This is in line with empirical evidence. Rodriguez and Sachs [1999] promote the idea of income convergence from above, and empirical work by de Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega [2005] validates this result. Note that this result is obtained without resorting to Matsuyama-style positive externalities in manufacturing (Matsuyama [1992] ).
The dynamics in section I are too complex to solve analytically, but yield ambiguous results both with respect to income levels and growth rates. This is easily demonstrated for the simplest case where the tax rate τ approaches zero -the case where the informal economy is thriving and the ruler has virtually no possibility to claim part of the value added generated. For τ → 0, it is evident from (17) that then ∂ π G ∂ D > 0, so that the ruler should (given my specification) optimally set D = 1 (and, hence, φ = Q − 1). All of the resource is defended in this case, and thus E * = 0, so that aggregate income is simply GDP = R + 2Q. Upon comparing this to the income level in the absence of resource extraction (i.e. GDP N = 2(1 + Q)), it is evident that resources raise income levels in the economy as long as R > 2 holds. Income will be lower if the reverse condition holds. The result for the growth rate is simpler,
, so that income is falling over time.
Conclusions
Two recently emerged branches of literature hold abundance of natural resources responsible for both civil unrest and slow economic growth. I argue that these two phenomena are not independent, and propose a unified model that links resource rents to the allocation of effort between production and conflict.
The model provides insights into the different conflict experiences of resource rich countries (depending on their degree of resource wealth). In addition, I investigate the effect of resource wealth on a country's income. Recognizing that resource rents fall over time, I am able to follow a single economy over time and trace out its growth experience.
My main analytical results are consistent with empirical evidence: (1) in line with findings of Collier and Hoeffler [1998] and Collier and Hoeffler [2004] , I unearth a non-monotonous relation between resources and conflict intensity, and (2) following work of Sachs and Warner [1997] and others I find that resource wealth tends to slow down growth (but may raise income levels). Note that the model can also be used to make predictions on how new resource discoveries might affect the (economic) fate of a country.
Since analytical results are sometimes hard to obtain in conflict models, I had to invoke a number of simplifying assumptions to maintain tractability. The main ones, arguably, are (i) the exogenous budgets of the ruler and the people, Q and N, and (ii) the simplified model set-up where I treat the tax rate as a parameter (rather than a choice variable). Relaxing these assumptions involves searching for numerical solutions. For a model with an endogenous tax rate 32 , numerical solutions show that the qualitative behaviour of the optimal contesting efforts of the two agents is unchanged. The optimal tax rate in this case increases as resource rents go down, emphasizing the intuitive result of the paper that the ruler concentrates his effort on the manufacturing sector as rents dry up.
In the present paper I focus on the role of resources in conflict. That is not to deny that there are other factors that may trigger violent clashes, such as ethnic hostilities. However, the main argument of this paper is that resource rents may be one of the factors fueling conflict. The exact way in which they do is the object of investigation.
Policy wise the model gives some hints on what to consider when the goal is minimizing conflict activities. Following the model there are essentially two ways to achieve minimum conflict, either take out the resource all at once, while at the same time repressing rebels harshly, or extracting very little at a time, so as not to trigger too much greed among the population.
Thus the model presented in this paper contributes not only towards understanding conflict phenomena that undermine many societies, but provides also a formal foundation for policy driven solutions.
Appendix 1 Proofs regarding the path of D
Proof that the objective function is concave: The second derivative of the objective function is
which is always the case, so that I can conclude that the objective function is concave in D.
Proof that D * (R) is concave: First note that
Proof that the ruler will never defend all of the resource: For this consider
So it is never optimal for the government to secure all of the resource (to choose D * = 1), i.e there is always something left for the rebels to grab. This result also implies that the government will never find it optimal to spend all of its endowment on defending (as I assumed that Q ≥ 1), so D * < Q.
Proofs regarding the path of E
Derivation of
• The bounty effect is always negative:
• The overall effect:
The last inequality follows from D < 1 + Q. Thus, one can conclude that the negative prize effect always overweighs the positive public good effect and E * is decreasing in R, i.e.
Proofs regarding the paths of D * and E * A sufficient (though not necessary) condition for the two effort paths, D * and E * , to cross is that R is such that
where E max is the maximum value reached by E * :
If condition (63) is fulfilled, then D * is at some point (at least) as high as E max .
Knowing that D * = 0 and E = E max at R = R, the two curves must then cross at some R > R. A hump-shaped conflict path emerges. Calculations yield that the value of R where (63) holds is given by
Whenever R max > R it is ensured that a crossing of effort paths exists.
Proofs regarding the effect of an increase in τ
Starting from equation (16) and implicitly differentiating it with respect to τ I can derive the effect of an increase in τ on optimal defense effort of the government. I find
To see the sign of the above expression note that
The signs of the other partial derivatives are discussed in Appendix 2. From expression (A-28) it is obvious that the effect of an increase in τ is ambiguous. The intuition for the effects is the following: Effect A and B both show that the marginal benefits of D increase, if τ is high. Knowing that ∂ MB ∂ D < 0 from the denominator of expression (A-28), these effects thus work to increase D * . Let us look at the two effects separately. Effect A: Increasing D lets people grab less. This effect is stronger if τ is high. When τ increases, people work less, i.e. fight more, since they get to keep less of the manufacturing output. A higher E makes, by assumption, governmental defense more effective. Thus this effect works to increase D * . Effect B: Increasing D induces people to work more, broadening the tax base. This effect is stronger if τ is high, thus also increasing D * .
On the marginal cost side the two effects, X and Y, are counteracting. Thus it is not clear what happens to the marginal costs of D, if τ increases. Effect X: If the tax rate is high, people fight more. Thus it is not so bad for the ruler to provide little public good (i.e. to defend a lot), since the public good is not put to much use anyway. This effect thus works to decrease the marginal cost of D. Since I know from the denominator of the above expression that 
Proofs regarding the trajectory of income Proofs regarding Stage II: I know
This is a concave function in R:
The maximum of this function is reached at R * :
And so
Income in the resource rich country is higher than income in the resource poor country (which I call GDP N here) when R < R. That is,
Note that R * < R. Plotting the three relevant levels of R as a function of (1 − τ) one gets the following picture (for a given level of Q 33 ): Figure A1 : The three relevant levels of R plotted as a function of (1 − τ)
There are three cases to be distinguished: For low levels of (1 − τ) (i.e. high τ) I can see from the picture that R * < R < R. For intermediate levels of (1 − τ) (i.e. intermediate τ), it is the case that R * < R < R. Finally for high values of (1 − τ) (i.e. low τ), R < R * < R. The different cases are treated verbally in the main text. Below see the graphical representation of all three scenarios: Figure A2 : The trajectory of income for low (1 − τ) 33 Note that I assume here that Q is such that the graph looks as in Figure A1 , i.e. Q is not too large. If Q were "too large", not all of the ranges defined by Figure A1 exist. 
Appendix 2: a general model
The general setup is the same as in the model of the main text. There are two agents in the economy, the government and the people, that can put their endowment into two different, separate sectors (a production and a resource (conflict) sector). As in the main text the two budget constraints hold with equality, i.e. φ = Q − D and
Production in the production sector is given by F(φ ,W), and grabbing is given by R·G (E,D) , that is -independent of the size of R -grabbing is always determined by relative contesting effort levels. (1−G)R is then the part of the resource rent left for the ruler.
30
Some assumption on the derivatives of the primitives are imposed. In particular I assume for the production function
The assumptions on the grabbing function are By backwards induction I first consider the people's problem, which is the following:
Assuming interior solutions throughout, the FOC of the people is given by
The LHS denotes the marginal benefit of an increase in E, the RHS the marginal cost. If rebels devote more effort to stealing, they can secure more of the resource (MB). On the other hand, if people steal more, they have less time left to devote to working. Therefore people's income from the manufacturing sector decreases (MC).
34 To see why consider the example of F(φ (D)). Here we find that
∂ φ 2 ≤ 0 (i.e. non-increasing marginal returns as is standard to assume) implies
A similar reasoning can be applied to see why
Next I want to find out whether rebels' stealing effort E and governmental defense D are strategic substitutes or complements. For this let us examine how the MB and the MC of E change with an increase in D. Totally differentiating the FOC (AA-5) one finds
That is,
then (E,D) are strategic complements.
then (E,D) are strategic substitutes
With the specification considered in the paper condition (AA-8) holds for any R, i.e. (E,D) are strategic substitutes. In what follows I assume that condition (AA-8) holds (to make the general analysis comparable to the main text). Also I assume that 
Next note that I assume 
< 0, which means that for high levels of D the marginal returns to E in grabbing are decreasing faster. Given the above -all reasonable -assumptions, one arrives at
Investigating the numerator in expression (AA-6) tells us how the MC and MB of E change if D increases.
First if the government increases its defense effort, less resources are left to be invested in the public good. This implies that the productivity of effort in production falls, so that the opportunity cost of stealing decreases. This means that the MC of E decreases at any given level of E (compared to a situation with low D). Inspecting the denominator of (AA-6) one finds ∂ MC ∂ E > 0. Thus this effect works to increase E (since for an (interior) optimum MB = MC is needed).
Second, if D increases there is less to steal for the people (the unsecured rent, i.e. the potential prize for the rebels, becomes smaller). This is to say that the MB of E decreases at any given level of E (compared to a situation with low D). Again from the denominator of (AA-6) one knows ∂ MB ∂ E < 0. Thus, this effect works to decrease E.
The two effects are counteracting and thus the ambiguous result derived above. From above I can also derive
∂ D∂ R , which I will need later. I find that
Since given the assumptions the LHS is smaller than 0 and the RHS is bigger than 0, this condition is always fulfilled, and thus
It is rather intuitive that fighting effort of the people increases with the potential prize, i.e. 
which is greater than zero given the assumptions on the primitives. 
where E(D) is defined by (AA-5), and
(AA-19) (AA-14) can be rewritten as
This re-formulation of the problem is needed in order to be able to apply the envelope theorem. The FOC of the ruler is given by:
The last part can be found by using the envelope theorem (because D is just a parameter in the people's optimization problem):
From the FOC of the people (
∂ E = 0) we know that the latter part is 0, i.e. only the direct effect is relevant, so that
Plugging this in, the FOC of the government is then given by
Note that equation (AA-25) corresponds to equations (16) and (17) in the main text. Rewriting (AA-25), the FOC is given by
(AA-26) The LHS denotes the MB of D, the RHS the MC. A higher D lets the people grab less (so more of R is left for the ruler, MB1) and induces people to work more (broadening the tax base and thereby also increasing the income of the ruler, MB2). These effects make up the marginal benefits of D. There is also a marginal cost of D (MC). Less of the public good is provided and therefore manufacturing income is lower.
From here, we can find a general expression for -27) This gives
That is, given (E, D) are strategic substitutes and the assumptions imposed on the primitives in the beginning we find that
e. the ruler's defense effort increases in the prize R.
The intuition for the above result is the following: Investigating the numerator in expression (AA-27) tells us how the marginal benefits and marginal costs of D change with an increase in R. First, one finds that
∂ R > 0. Governmental defense effort is more effective if the prize R is high. Second, one finds ∂ R . How is the marginal product of φ is affected by an increase in R? R does not enter the production function, so there is no direct effect. There is an indirect effect though, since E is affected by R, and the marginal product of φ is affected by the working effort of the people. I know that people steal more if there is more to win (i.e. if R increases) and therefore spend less effort on working. This in turn implies that the public good is less effective, so that a decrease in the level of the public good is "less bad" for the ruler's payoff from the manufacturing sector. That is The problem of the people revisited: the path of E * Next, I consider ∂E * ∂ R , so the effect of an increase in R on the equilibrium E. That is here I take into account the reaction of the ruler to an increase in R. Recall the FOC of the people, as given by
Totally differentiating (AA-28), one arrives at
is not "too positive" (as is the case in the main text). Note that, as explained in the main text, there are three effects on the marginal benefits and marginal costs of E respectively.
There is a bounty effect, which is made up of two separate effects, effects A and B.
The direct bounty effect, that is an increase in R increases the bounty (A). Effect A thus works to increase the MB of E. In addition there is an indirect bounty effect, that is an increase in R triggers an increase in D, which in turn lowers the bounty (B). That is effect B decreases the MB of E. Also, there is a public good effect (an increase in R triggers an increase in D, which in turn lowers the public good offered (C)). This means that the MC of E is reduced. Note the resemblance of this to the analysis done before, when I investigated the effect of an increase in D on E. There I found the effect of a marginal increase in D on E. This is quite similar to the problem here, where two of the three effects (effect B and C) I consider are driven by an increase in D. There is an additional effect here, that is the direct effect of R on the marginal benefit of E (effect A).
Considering the denominator in equation (AA-30) I know that
∂ E > 0, so that effect A works to increase optimal E, effect B works to decrease optimal E and effect C works to increase optimal E. Thus the ambiguity observed in the formal derivation above.
Appendix 3: additional proofs Endogenous τ
To address the concern of an endogenous τ, let me consider a model in which the government has (essentially) two choice variables, D and φ as in the paper (where φ = Q − D from the effort constraint of the government), as well as τ. In particular, I look at the following optimization problem of the government: (AAA-8)
In the above equation the government can set the tax rate at cost c.
Since the endowment constraint of the government (AAA-4) is always fulfilled with equality a solution to the above optimization problem is characterized by the pair (D * ,τ * ). For (D * ,τ * ), the following two first order conditions have to be fulfilled simultaneously:
Equations (AAA-9) and (AAA-10) are taken from the main text. In equation (AAA-11) one can identify the different effects of an increase in τ on the government's payoff. On the one hand, a higher τ implies that the government receives more from the production sector in form of taxes, i.e. this effect impacts positively on the government's payoff. On the other hand there are also negative effects. An increase in τ decreases the people's working effort (and thus increases their fighting effort), since they now get to keep less of what they produce in the production sector. Last, there are also costs incurred by the government to set a higher tax rate. Unfortunately such a model is not analytically solvable. I therefore search for a numerical solution of this new optimization problem. I find that the qualitative behaviour of the model outcomes is the same as in the paper with an exogenous tax rate. This can be seen graphically in the figures below which result from numerical optimization of the model in Figure AAA1 for expositional purposes. The graphs above are, just as the figures in the paper, drawn for decreasing R. Note that the Hessian at the displayed numerical solutions is negative definite, that is a maximum is reached. We see that, as R decreases, the government's defense effort D decreases, whereas the people's stealing effort E increases. This is the same qualitative result as in the model of the paper, where I assume -for analytical tractability -that τ is fixed. Here the optimal tax rate τ increases, as R decreases. That is, as the resource rents become smaller the government concentrates its effort (in the form of public good provision and tax rate) on the production sector.
Outcome of a Cournot game
The reaction functions in this setup would be of the following form: For the people (as in the paper):
I know (taking assumptions as in the paper) that ∂E ∂ D < 0. For the ruler: ∂ D∂ R < 0. That is the slope of E(D) in the graph above becomes more negative if R increases. In addition I find that
If the production function were linear in D (as in the specification of the paper), One sees unambiguously, E * falls (from E * to E * ′ ) if R increases -a result qualitatively similar to the one in the paper. Different to the paper though, the ruler's defense effort D * could increase or decrease as a result of an increase in R.
A model with conflict over production instead of over a rental flow
Here I consider how the model outcomes would differ if there were no contested rental flow but instead the government would devote resources to collect taxes:
Assume the government's choice variables are φ and D, and the population chooses W and E. Also assume the tax rate is a function of both contesting efforts, i.e. τ(D,E). Now rather than fighting over an exogenous rent flow R, the ruler and the people "fight" over the distribution of an endogenous prize, the manufacturing output. The model outcome is different to the one in the paper because the prize is endogenous (rather than exogenous as in the paper). Let me formalize this: The people's problem is given by
The FOC is given by
Note that the term (− 
∂ E
A and B denote the change in the MC of E, whereas X and Y denote the change in the MB of E. First I inspect the change in the MC of E. The term B captures an effect also present in the model of the paper: if D increases, φ decreases and thus the opportunity cost of fighting decreases. This works to decrease the MC of E. In this setup there is an additional effect not present in the paper though, that is effect A. If D increases, τ increases and thus the opportunity cost of fighting decreases further (since less of what is produced can be kept by the people). This effect works to decrease the MC of E even further. Also when looking at the change of the MB of E there is an additional effect here, not present in the paper. First, effect X is the one also present in the paper. If D increases, this reduces the impact of E on τ (assuming 
